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The Tax Harmony Assumption 
Taxation and tax policy reform appears on the political agenda in most advanced welfare states in Europe 
and North America. Of course studies of taxation and tax policy are nothing new and have existed ever 
since people have paid taxes. The current work is situated in the context of the future of the welfare state 
and the reinforced international economic and political integration referred to as “globalization.” The purpose 
of this paper is to analyze how globalization is affecting tax policy in advanced welfare states. In comparing 
the evolution of tax policy in Canada with those in the United States, Germany and Sweden from 1960 to 
1995, I will try to review the conventional antiglobalization thesis, i.e., that globalization leads to a “race to 
the bottom” in revenue and expenditures policies, or as others have called it, a “beggar the neighbour 
policy” (Tanzi and Bovenberg 1990, 187).   
 
There are at least four major functions of fiscal policy and taxation in the modern economy (Boskin 1978, 2). 
First, they direct the financing of government expenditures; second, they redistribute income of citizens; 
third, they serve to encourage or discourage certain activities; and fourth, they stabilize the overall 
economy. These functions of taxation are very important for the legitimacy and balance of modern welfare 
states. If we follow the conventional antiglobalization thesis, these functions are endangered under the 
present processes of reinforced international economic and financial integration. As well, the increased 
mobility of capital across national borders is alleged to put pressure on governments to decrease the overall 
tax burden and therefore to cut aggregate expenditures, especially on welfare. Governments are also forced 
by capital mobility to shift the tax mix away from progressive and relatively mobile direct (high income and 
capital) taxes towards more regressive and immobile indirect (consumption and labour) taxes (Sinn 1990; 
CERP 1993; Steinmo 1996; Andersson  et al. 1998; Schulze and Ursprung 1999). They also enter into a tax 
competition to attract global capital, which is supposed to lead to a race to the bottom in corporation tax 
rates and finally to a fiscal crisis of the state (Scharpf 1997, 531; Frey 1990, 8). Following this frame of 
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thought, the race to the bottom supposedly ends only when the tax rate on mobile factors has fallen to zero 
(Sinn 1992; Strange 1996). This results in a lowering and growing convergence of national tax rates and 
overall tax and expenditure burden profiles (Hobson 2003, 39; Andrews 1994; Moses 1994).  
 
Proponents of this thesis argue that economic performance – output, price stability, and income  – is 
significantly determined by the willingness of the owners of capital to continue to invest in productive 
activities. This argument stresses that the political role of investment in market-oriented democracies is 
crucial for state policy-makers, because of the nature of democratic politics and institutions. In this view, 
good economic performance is necessary for the continued popular approval and re-election of incumbents 
(Swank 1998). Indeed, in the late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, a wave of tax reforms swept 
through the Western world, mainly effecting income taxes. Starting with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the 
USA, tax reform legislation was instituted between 1986 and 1991 in nearly all OECD countries that lowered 
top marginal rates on personal income tax. Many states also reduced their corporate tax rates during this 
period, but all governments accompanied these reforms with efforts to expand their tax base and to close 
many common tax loopholes. A frequent explanation for the near simultaneity of these changes is that 
economic integration forced governments to reform their tax systems in response to reforms in other 
countries (Lee and McKenzie 1989; Steinmo 1993).  
 
What the Facts Argue on Tax Harmonization  
A closer empirical look at the evolution of tax revenues and tax system changes in advanced welfare states 
from 1960 to 2001 reveals a complete different picture. Figure 1 presents the evolution of total tax revenues 
as percentage of GDP from 1965 to 2001. As the data show, not only is there no decline in tax revenues in 
this period, but there is a moderate to high increase. Sweden is at the top and the USA at the bottom of the 
countries analyzed, and Canada and Germany are in the middle, near the OECD average. What is striking 
about this evolution is the degree to which tax revenues have increased in an era of intensifying capital 
mobility. There seems to be a positive rather than negative relationship between antiglobalization sentiment 
and tax revenues in advanced welfare states, a conclusion that stands contrary to the conventional 
globalization thesis.  
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Source Revenue Statistics, 1965/2001, OECD. Paris 2002. 
 
What about the second thesis, namely that globalization leads to a decrease of direct taxes and a shifting of 
the tax burden from direct to indirect taxes? Figure 2 measures the evolution of taxes on income and profits 
as a percentage of GDP; the outcome is c omparable to that in figure 1. Again, there are no signs of 
decreasing tax revenues from income and profits since 1975. While tax revenues from income and profits 
remain steady in Sweden, there is a moderate increase in Canada and the USA and a moderate decrease 
in Germany. There seems to be no correlation between capital mobility and tax revenues from income and 
profits. 
 
In contrast with Canada’s position on total tax revenues, in the case of tax revenues on income and profits 
Canada is clearly above the OECD average, at least it has been since the beginning of the 1980s, although 
it still has lower revenues than Sweden. USA and Germany are located largely beneath the OECD average, 
taking into account an increase in tax revenues in the USA in the mid-1990s that puts them just above the 
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Source Revenue Statistics, 1965/2001, OECD. Paris 2002. 
 
A similar picture can be drawn from the evolution of revenues from personal income taxes. As we can see 
in figure 3, there is again no clear sign of a decrease in tax revenues from personal income. In stark 
contrast with the conventional antiglobalization thesis, we find a moderate increase in tax revenues from 
personal income in all countries. 
 
Again, Sweden is at the top of the ranking and the United States at the bottom. A slightly different picture is 
shown in figure 4. Here we see declining corporate tax revenues in the USA and Canada, especially in the 
1980s, but growing revenues from this tax base again in the 1990s. In Sweden, tax revenues have been 
increasing since the beginning of the 1990s. In Germany, revenues from corporate taxation have declined 
since 1990. While these data appear to undermine the conventional antiglobalization thesis, we need to 
address two problems in regard to corporate income tax. The first is political: The decision of a corporation 
to invest in a specific country is based not just on tax rates, but also on other aspects like infrastructure, the 
educational system and social conditions. The second is economic and financial: The starting point for 
measuring actual taxes paid by corporations is corporation income taxes, which are a direct cost of doing 
business. However, corporate income taxes are not the only taxes businesses pay, and they are not 
necessarily the most costly. There are other taxes, such as payroll taxes and particular contributions to 
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social security. The evolution of the later tax is shown in figure 5. (For a detailed discussion of average 
corporate tax rates, see Stewart and Webb 2003; Mendoza et al. 1994; Carey and Tchilingurian 2000.) 
Here we see a clear increase in social security contributions by employers since 1965: a moderate increase 
in Canada, USA and Germany and a sharp increase in Sweden, although revenues from social security 
contributions have begun to decline in Sweden since 1990. 
Source Revenue Statistics 1965/2001, OECD. Paris, 2002. 
 
As we can see, there is no empirical support for the notion that globalization forces governments to reduce 
direct taxes. Contrary to the conventional proposition that high capital mobility forces governments to cut 
back direct taxes, the data show that overall increases in government taxation since the 1965 have mainly 
been produced by increases in direct and personal income taxes and social security contributions (Hobson 
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Source Revenue Statistics 1965/2001, OECD. Paris, 2002. 
 
As Hobson (2003, 44) has shown, there are also no data to support the shifting tax base thesis. Capital tax 
burdens have risen considerably and consistently since the 1970s (see also Swank 1998; Ganghof 2001). 
Labour taxes remained far lower than capital tax increases throughout that period. Hobson concludes that 
“at a time when global capital flows are at highest point, we see a substitution of capital taxes for labour 
taxes which, of course, is precisely the inverse scenario to that of conventional expectations” (2003, 45). 
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Source Revenue Statistics 1965/2001, OECD. Paris, 2002. 
 
To sum up, what are the empirical findings with respect to conventional predictions on the impact of 
globalization on the fiscal situation of modern welfare states? The main prediction was of a growing 
convergence in national tax regimes and tax rates, because all countries are caught in tax competition and 
a “beggar the neighbour” policy to attract foreign capital. Strikingly, in all tax categories, except corporate 
income tax, there are still major differences between national tax regimes and no signs of convergence as a 
result of enhanced international economic and fiscal integration. Peter Garret seems to be right when he 
concludes that “the conventional wisdom is too simple and considerably overdrawn” (1995, 682). What 
should we say about the relationship between globalization and tax policy reform in the OECD countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s? (for detailed discussion of this issue see Sandford 1993 and Hale 2002). As there is 
no direct correlation, there may well be some mediating factors that have an impact on the influence of 
globalization on tax policy reform.  
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Putting Canada in Comparative Context 
After taking a closer look at some central features of the Canadian tax system relative to those in advanced 
welfare states, we find the Canadian tax system emerging as a series of compromises between competing 
political and ideological priorities that are embedded in Canadian political life. There are a few important 
elements in the Canadian tax system that help to place it in comparative perspective (for a detailed analysis 
of tax policy in Canada, see Hale 2002). Canada’s tax rates on personal income are relatively high and take 
effect at modest income levels compared with those of Canada’s main trading partners. Corporate tax rates 
are competitive and  favour the growth of manufacturing resources and small business sources, but the 
rates for most service industries are high (Hale 2002, 15). Capital gains taxes are levied on the sale of most 
shares and other investments on the death of their owners, but there are no estate or inheritance taxes. 
Sales tax levels are high, especially compared with those in the USA. They mainly pay for Canada’s higher 
per capita public spending. During the late 1990s there was a significant increase in payroll taxes, mainly to 
restore the Canadian Pension Plan to financial solvency. In addition, there are relatively generous 
incentives for retirement, and more recently, for education savings. This goes hand in hand with a growing 
number of income transfer programs that are administered through the tax system.  
 
The Role of Political Parties, Social Priorities and Underlying Values 
What can we conclude about the tax systems in the four countries we have analyzed? As we can see in 
figure 6, personal income taxes are high as a proportion of total tax revenues in Canada and the USA. 
Sweden and Germany have the lowest share of personal income taxes. Germany has the highest 
proportion of social security contributions, just a few points ahead of Sweden and Canada, with the USA at 
the bottom of this ranking. In the case of corporate income taxation, it is highest in Canada and the United 
States, followed by Sweden and Germany. This analysis indicates not just different tax burdens (tax-to-GDP 
ratio), but different tax regime structures (tax-to-total-taxes ratio).  
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Source Revenue Statistics 1965/2001, OECD. Paris, 2002. 
 
In looking at the differences between the four countries in this sample, even without taking into account the 
broader picture of the OECD countries, we come to the same conclusion (Wagschal 2001, 134).  We can 
distinguish at least three different tax regimes or approaches to taxation: 
 
1.  A liberal-conservative tax regime: Canada, USA, and from a broader perspective, Switzerland, 
Japan, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand  
2.  A Christian-democratic or corporatist tax regime: Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and 
France 
3.  A social democratic tax regime: Sweden, Denmark and Finland  
 
How can we best characterize the different worlds of taxation? Primarily, there is the territorial aspect. The 
spatial connection of the different worlds of taxation refers to the “families of nations” concept (Castles 
1993). The worlds of taxation are also strongly related to partisan politics, in other words, the party 
composition of governments (Garrett 1998; Esping-Anderson 1990). Tax r ates and the tax system 
structures are both connected to party preferences. Analogous to the different worlds of taxation is the 
ideological dominance of the various parties in government. So Garrett’s suggestion in the broader context 






Figure 6: Tax Revenue of Major Taxes as a Percentage of Total Tax 
Revenues, 1998
Personal Income Corporate Income
Social Security and other payroll Property
Goods and Services  10 
of globalization and domestic politics in industrial countries (1998) is trumped by the findings regarding the 
different tax regimes: Partisan politics do matter.   
 
Uwe Wagschal (2001, 137) points out another interesting factor that has a bearing on the various tax 
regimes: religion. The social democratic and the liberal conservative tax regimes are mostly in protestant 
countries,  and the Christian democratic regimes are in Catholic countries. It appears therefore that religion 
is important not only to society but also to the party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), welfare regime 
structures, (Kersbergen 1995; Castles 2000), and tax rates and tax system structures. In Europe religious 
teachings are transformed into politics by party systems, and religion has a lasting effect on values and 
moral beliefs.  In terms of the tax systems, this is manifested in two principles of taxation: the “ability to pay” 
principle, dominant in Protestant countries, and the “benefit principle,” which prevails in Catholic countries. 
Tax regimes can thus be differentiated according to two criteria: the level of taxation and the operating 
taxation principle (see figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Structure of the tax regimes 
Rate of taxation   
High  Low 
Ability to pay 
principle 
Social democratic tax 
regime 










































































Source Uwe Wagschal, 2001. “Deutschlands Steuerstaat und die vier Welten der Besteuerung.“ In 
Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik. Institutionen, politischer Prozess und Leistungsprofil, edited by Manfred G. Schmidt. 
Opladen: Leske and Budrich. 
 
We can therefore describe the three worlds of taxation as follows. The conservative-liberal tax regime is 
characterized by a high proportion of direct taxes (individual, corporate, wealth). Social security   11 
contributions and tax rates on consumption are relatively low. In contrast, in the Christian democratic tax 
regime there is a broader concept of taxation, with, typically, many different taxes. Direct taxes are not as 
essential to total tax revenues as they are in liberal regimes, but social security contributions do make up a 
big part of government revenues. There is a high tax burden on labour in Christian democratic tax regimes. 
In social democratic tax regimes, high total tax revenues are mainly composed of high income taxes and 
above average taxes on consumption. Social security contributions are relatively low (Wagschal 2001, 140). 
 
Other Key Determinants of Tax Policy  
In comparing the three tax regimes we find other determinants that shaped tax policy in addition to 
globalization, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Party politics is a key factor accounting for differences, 
especially to explain the structure and complexity of tax systems. There is, not surprisingly, a negative 
correlation between conservative parties and total tax revenues, on the one hand, and a positive correlation 
between left-wing parties and total tax revenues, on the other; so parties do matter (Wagschal 2001, 144). 
Thus the interests of the parties are manifested in tax policies: left-wing parties go for a redistribution of 
income to fight poverty, while conservative parties focus on wealth creation, price stability, market economy 
and low taxes (Klingeman et. al. 1994). Party politics also have an impact on the actual structure of the tax 
system. For example, in the Christian democratic taxation world, a high percentage of tax revenues are 
accounted for by social security contributions. Therefore, this is an instance where families are favoured in 
the tax system (for other effects of party politics on taxation, see Garrett 1998, 87). There are many case 
studies (Webber and Wildavsky 1986; Schick 1993; Steinmo 1995; Wildavsky and Caiden 1997) and 
comparative studies (Castles 1998) that focus on the tax preferences of parties and that confirm the strong 
correlation between partisan politics and tax policy. Political swings from the Left to the Right appear to 
have been a principle cause of tax reforms starting in the late 1980s. In the mid- to late-1980s, conservative 
parties controlled the governments of many OECD counties: there was Christian democratic and 
conservative dominance in Germany and Great Britain, the Mulroney government in Canada from 1984 to 
1993, and Republican control of the Senate through 1986 and the presidency through 1992 in the USA.  
 
From a social perspective tax policy is mainly a function of the balance of power between different interest 
groups and their positions in the political system. The degree of corporatism, union density and the 
frequency of strikes are important indicators in this regard. The influence of corporatism on tax policy has 
been shown in some comparative and quantitative studies (Steinmo and Tolbert 1998; Garrett 1998) Simply   12 
put, the more hegemonic the  corporatist model, the higher the tax levels. Wagschal (2001, 146) 
summarizes the corporatist argument correctly when he says that in government, left-wing parties deal with 
strong labour unions better than do conservative ones. On the other side, when unions are weak, it is easier 
for conservative parties to advance their economic policies. 
 
Strongly linked to the corporatism argument is another important perspective on the pace and depth of the 
neoliberal tax model: the structure of productivity-oriented co-operation. Countries may be classified 
according to the extent of national co-ordination through economy-wide bargaining among relatively 
centralized national employer and union associations (Soskice 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). Nations 
vary according to the degree of sectoral co-ordination of the economy, and this aspect is vitally important for 
tax policy. As Hall and Gingerich (2001) have argued, elements of national economic models are 
functionally interdependent. Comprehensive reforms in one area of the model have significant implications 
for the performance of other aspects of the model. As Soskice (1999) argues, business, labour and the 
state have a critical interest in preserving existing elements of economic models. Employers in sectorally 
co-ordinated market economies will not embrace significant neoliberal reforms when the reforms cause 
undue uncertainty. In fact, support among German employers for maintaining basic elements of the 
generous welfare state was arguably rooted in business’s interests in promoting long-term stability in labour 
and industrial relations (Swank 2002). Duane Swank says correctly that “Generally, the greater the national 
or sector coordination of the economy, the higher the cost…to policy makers from emulation of market-
conforming tax policy reforms; benefits from maintenance of extant tax structures or incremental reforms to 
it…will also be higher in coordinated market economies” (2002, 17). With respect to tax policy, the 
integration of labour into the bargaining process is related to higher social welfare expenditures and a 
greater emphasis on the politics of redistribution (Garrett and Lange 1985). In countries where business and 
labour interests are highly integrated into the governmental decision process, as is the case in Sweden and 
Germany, tax policy is made with the consent of labour and business interests. Such a structure provides 
an environment conducive to respective elites bargaining with governmental officials over economic goals 
and social welfare policy. On the other hand, in countries where interests are organized into many groups 
that are narrow in focus and outside the decision making process, policy-makers must respond to a much 
wider spectrum of demands and interests. In this context, policy choices tend to be more piecemeal and 
have shorter time horizons (Steinmo and Tolbert 1998, 169).   
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The impact of political institutions on state policy in general and tax policy in particular should also be 
considered (Weaver and Rockman 1993). In particular, the so called “veto players” (Tsebelis 1995, 1999) 
have considerable influence on tax revenues (Castles 1998) and tax policy reform (Hallerberg and Basinger 
1999; Ganghof 1999). As several studies show (Huber et al. 1993; Schmidt 1996), veto players slow down 
tax policy reforms. The more checks and balances in the political system, the lower the tax revenues. This 
may be a function of the reform capacity of the political system in general. Socio-economic factors are also 
important for tax policy. There is an especially strong correlation between tax policy and two socio-
economic factors (Wagschal 2001, 143; Swank 1998): The first is the percentage of retired taxpayers in a 
society: the higher it is, the higher the tax revenues. The second is the rate of economic growth:  the higher 
it is, the lower the tax rates.  Neoconservatives turn this argument around, suggesting that lower tax rates 
lead to more economic growth in the long run.  What is important is the policy inheritance. From this 
perspective, tax policy is often a policy of nondecision, because the political costs of tax reform are much 
higher for politicians than the political benefits.  
 
Conclusion 
The empirical data and theoretical models clearly show that globalization is one relatively minor factor 
among many that explain tax policy reforms. And even that limited influence is mediated by domestic 
political systems, institutions and constellations of actors. As the data has shown, the conventional 
globalization thesis of a race to the bottom is not borne out. Tax rates and tax revenues are still increasing, 
despite the ongoing trend toward international trade integration. Countervailing pressures like the high cost 
of welfare programs, different parties in government, strong labour unions, and institutional veto players 
counteract the pressure of globalization on tax policy. 
 
As for the future of taxation in Canada, it is more likely to be one of gradual evolution than radical change. 
Although the data don’t show any downward pressure on tax rates and tax revenues comparatively 
speaking, there are at least four key factors in Canada that are likely to put pressure on future tax rates, 
although regional political dynamics and the workings of fiscal federalism suggest that tax reductions will be 
a higher priority in some provinces than others (Hale 2002). First, neoliberalism will continue to shape fiscal 
and tax policy, including the role of the tax system in delivering social policies and programs in most parts of 
Canada. Second, governments that seek to define their own economic and social priorities rather than 
simply react to events beyond their borders will have to exercise centralized control over budgetary policies   14 
and spending levels if they hope to foster the economic growth needed to finance social services in the 
context of Canada’s changing demographics. Third, the ability of governments to combine the promotion of 
economic growth and higher living standards will be closely linked to their ability to develop a workable 
division of responsibilities among federal and provincial governments and with other national governments. 
Finally, the diffusion of new technologies will continue to transform national and regional economies while 
giving individuals greater opportunity to avoid government and tax regulations that run contrary to their 
perceived interests and values. This discussion of determinants that shape tax policy reform has shown that 
successful management of fiscal and tax policy requires a capacity to set priorities; adapt to changing 
circumstances; and build a consensus that enables competing economic, social, regional and ideological 
interests to identify their own well-being in the broader political and economic environment. Tax policy is 
shaped by many political, economic and social determinants. As Geoffrey Hale correctly concludes, “it 
should not be surprising if the tax system stubbornly refuses to confirm either economic theories or political 
ideologies, but reflects past decisions and the policy tradeoffs of the political process” (2002, 71). The 
notion of tax policy being driven by globalization and forces associated with globalization (both positive and 
negative) is simply not borne by the facts.   15 
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